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Key points and Recommendations 
The development and functioning of the EU-Eastern Partnership Parliamentary Assembly 
(EuroNest PA) is the topic of this brief. We argue that, despite organising a number of 
meetings and adopting several resolutions in the past two years, the Assembly is failing to 
reach its objectives of promoting economic and political integration between the EU and the 
Eastern Partners. Three main problems are considered here: i) the criticism of the European 
Parliament for being inconsistent about the conditions under which countries can send 
delegates ii) the fact that the parliamentary meetings are too short and infrequent, and iii) the 
observation that Eastern Partners focus too much on national and bilateral issues, thus failing 
to engage in multilateral dialogue. 
We therefore recommend to the next European Parliament that it works on developing more 
concrete and measurable conditions for the representation of national parliaments; that it 
strives for longer and more frequent meetings of the different entities of the EuroNest PA; 
and that it ensures that plenary meetings are better synchronised with the other high-level 
multilateral meetings of the Eastern Partnership. 
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Conception and goals of EuroNest 
Besides the Eastern Partnership’s (EaP) 
bilateral and multilateral framework and the 
Civil Society Forum, the European Union 
(EU) engages with the EaP countries – 
Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan – through 
multilateral parliamentary cooperation, 
namely within the EuroNest Parliamentary 
Assembly (EuroNest PA). 
Although the EuroNest PA only became 
operational in 2011, the idea to create the 
Assembly dates back to 2006 and was 
preceded by a series of conferences with 
representatives from the European 
Parliament (EP), Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as 
Belarusian opposition members. Discussions 
regarding the participation of Belarus were 
the main reason for the delay in launching 
the Assembly (Ćwiek-Karpowicz & Wojna, 
2010). Prior to the adoption of rules for EP 
representation in its relations with third 
countries, the members of the EP (MEP) had 
to choose between three options: invite a 
delegation of the Belarusian Parliament, not 
involve Belarus at all, or include Belarus in 
the EuroNest PA while putting its active 
participation ‘on hold’ (Interview B, C). 
Eventually, the EP opted for the latter 
solution and suspended the Belarusian 
participation. It was decided that Belarus 
“will be welcomed once political 
requirements will have been fulfilled” 
(EuroNest PA ). In order to meet the political 
requirements, the Belarusian Parliament 
should be elected according to its 
commitments  made  to  the  Organization  for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
and other international standards for 
democratic elections, and commit itself to 
promoting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, pluralistic democracy and the rule 
of law (Buzek, 2011; EuroNest PA, 2011a, 
Art. 3). 
The EuroNest PA hosts 60 MEPs and 10 
members from each EaP countries’ 
Parliament (excluding Belarus). The EP 
therefore has a de facto majority as long as 
Belarus does not participate (60 out of a total 
of 110). Since the decisions are usually taken 
with a two-thirds majority, it does not 
translate into direct power over 
decision-making. However, the majority 
position of the EP could result de facto in a 
certain dominance of the EP in the 
Assembly. 
The Assembly aims to serve a number of 
objectives. The overall aim is to accelerate 
the political and economic integration 
between the EU and the EaP. In addition, the 
EuroNest PA serves to enhance the EU-EaP 
cooperation in the four thematic areas, i.e. 
fundamental values, economic integration, 
energy, and culture and people-to-people 
contacts (EuroNest PA, 2013e, Art. 1). Below, 
we outline how the experiences of the past 
two years provide important lessons for 
improving the work of the EuroNest PA, 
especially for the upcoming EP from 2014 
onwards. 
How does it work? 
T h e  E u r o N e s t  P A  c o n s i s t s  o f  f o u r  m a i n  
institutional components. First, the 
EuroNest PA elects a Bureau, both the EP 
and the EaP parliaments are represented as 
co-presidents and vice-presidents. The 
Bureau meets twice a year and plays a key 
coordinating role, both internally and 
externally. Internally, the Bureau drafts the 
agenda and procedures for plenary sessions 
of the EuroNest PA and authorises the 
thematic EuroNest PA Committees to draft, 
inter alia, reports, resolutions and 
recommendations. Externally, the Bureau is 
responsible for maintaining relations with 
other bodies and actors involved in the EaP, 
such as the EaP Summit, the ministerial 
conferences, the European Commission, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), 
the officials in EaP multilateral platforms, 
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Second, the Bureau of the EuroNest PA 
decides on creating working groups for a 
certain period of time to deal with a specific 
aspect of the EaP or to send fact-finding 
missions to the EU or the EaP countries. The 
working groups continue functioning until 
the EuroNest PA decides otherwise 
(EuroNest PA, 2013e, Art. 27). A working 
group comprises ten members: one from 
each EaP country and five from the EP. 
Currently, the EuroNest PA has a working 
group on the Rules of Procedure and one 
focusing on Belarus (EuroNest PA, 2012a, p. 
2). In the words of one EP official, the latter 
is a means to “compensate” for the absence 
of Belarusian delegation in the EuroNest PA 
(Interview B). 
Third, for the purpose of examining 
important aspects related to the EaP, the 
EuroNest PA has set up four Standing 
Committees comprising a maximum of 30 
members (15 members from the EP and 15 
from partner countries) that thematically 
mirror the four platforms of the EaP 
multilateral framework: the Committee on 
Political Affairs, Human Rights and 
Democracy; the Committee on Economic 
Integration, Legal Approximation and 
Convergence with EU Policies; the 
Committee on Energy Security; and the 
Committee on Social Affairs, Education, 
Culture and Civil Society. The committees 
meet twice a year and take decisions by a 
two-thirds majority. 
The fourth institutional component of 
EuroNest is the plenary assembly. The 
EuroNest PA conducts discussions and 
consultations, and adopts resolutions and 
recommendations concerning the EaP in 
general or on specific themes, according to 
its own rules of procedure (EuroNest PA, 
2013e). Decisions are made by a two-thirds 
majority of the present members (EuroNest 
PA, 2013e). The EuroNest PA holds plenary 
sessions once a year with the location 
decided on the basis of rotation. Up to now, 
there have been three plenary meetings (see 
below), with the fourth meeting scheduled 
to take place in Yerevan in November 2014. 
The EuroNest PA has a scrutiny role over the 
EU ‘executive’, e.g. the EEAS and the 
Commission. This forum is therefore one of 
the main tools available to the EP and EaP 
countries’ parliaments to influence EU 
decision-making  vis-à-vis the EaP 
(Kostanyan & Orbie, 2013). The members of 
the Assembly can submit written questions 
to the Council, the European Commission, 
the ministerial bodies of the EaP, and the 
rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU 
in charge of hosting the EaP Summit. The 
Bureau arranges public hearings with 
representatives from the relevant 
‘executives’, and members of the EuroNest 
PA can put questions orally. Both written 
and oral questions are subject to the 
Bureau’s ruling on their admissibility. At the 
request of 20 members of the EuroNest PA,  
answers to oral questions may be followed 
by a debate (EuroNest PA, 2013e, Art. 22). 
The setup of the EuroNest PA is comparable 
to other parliamentary assemblies of the EP 
with third countries’ parliaments, such as 
the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary 
Assembly (EMPA) and the EU-African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP) Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly. The main 
difference between the EMPA and the 
EuroNest PA is that EU member states’ 
national parliamentarians participate in the 
former but not in the latter. The structures 
and procedures of the EuroNest PA show a 
certain degree of norm transfer from the EP 
to the EaP countries’ parliaments: they 
reflect a ‘template’ of EU cooperation with 
third countries, impose a ‘way of doing 
things’ on the other parliaments, and 
familiarise these parliaments with European 
standards for multilateral cooperation. This 
does not mean that the EuroNest PA mirrors 
the institutional setup of the EP exactly: the 
EuroNest PA is much more limited in its 
structure and in the frequency of meetings, 
and the discussions are mostly ‘nationally’, 
not ideologically inspired, (see below). 4 | KOSTANYAN & VANDECASTEELE 
 
The institutional setup and rules of 
procedure are not the only way in which the 
EP transfers its norms and values. When 
deciding which EaP countries are allowed to 
send a delegation, the EP has also managed 
to push through its point of view in the 
EuroNest PA. The EP maintained a strict 
stance when it refused an official delegation 
from Belarus to take part in the Assembly. 
This did not result in direct influence over 
Belarus, but it was an important signal to the 
countries that do participate. However, the 
application of this strategy does not remain 
without criticism – notably of its coherence 
and double standards (see 
recommendations; also Kostanyan & 
Vandecasteele, 2013). With this inclusion 
and exclusion technique, the EP tries to 
compensate for its lack of formal 
instruments to exert direct pressure on the 
EaP countries in the format of the EuroNest 
PA. Indeed, the EP does not have carrots 
(such as funds granted on the basis of 
conditionality) or sticks (such as the power to 
impose visa bans or economic sanctions). It 
applies the only reward/punishment 
strategy it has at its disposal; it confers status 
and legitimacy by allowing or refusing EaP 
parliaments the right to participate in the 
EuroNest PA. 
EuroNest in action 
Three plenary sessions of the EuroNest PA 
have taken place so far. After a difficult 
kick-off, the participants of the EuroNest PA 
were able to adopt a number of resolutions. 
The first ordinary plenary session took place 
on 14-15 September 2011, in Strasbourg. The 
outcomes of this session were essentially 
only related internal procedures and 
appointments. Members of the Euronest PA 
also discussed a number of draft resolutions, 
but the meeting was marred by a tense 
atmosphere and none of the planned 
resolutions were adopted (EuroNest PA, 
2011b). There were disagreements between 
the EP and EaP representatives, but also 
between the EaP countries, notably Armenia 
and Azerbaijan (Donskis, 2011; Tarasyuk, 
2011). The main stumbling block was the 
difference in positions between the 
Azerbaijani and Armenian delegations on 
references to “right to self-determination” 
and “territorial integrity” with regard to 
Nagorno-Karabakh in the final statement. In 
addition, as a result of delays due to 
recounts, discussions and voting confusion, 
most MEPs left the meeting room in a hurry 
at the end of the two-day session since they 
had to attend a regular EP plenary (RFERL, 
2011, 16 September). 
In the early stages of the EuroNest 
cooperation, there was little indication that 
its members were moving toward their 
commonly stated goal, i.e. increasing 
dialogue and cooperation. The EP 
representatives could not convince their 
counterparts from the EaP to agree on a joint 
statement, and the delegations of the 
different parliaments did not consider 
themselves as belonging to one region, 
contrary to how the EP views the EaP 
initiative. 
The problems experienced by the EuroNest 
PA at its constitutive meeting carried over to 
the second plenary on 4-5 April 2012. Since 
the session took place in Baku, Azerbaijan, 
the conflict between Armenian and 
Azerbaijani members of the Assembly were 
even more in evidence than in the first 
plenary. Moreover, the Azerbaijani 
government used the opportunity to 
promote its agenda and harangue Armenia, 
notably in statements made by Azerbaijan’s 
President (President of Azerbaijan, 2012). An 
EU official shared his frustration over the 
proceedings, which ran counter to a prior 
agreement: 
“President Aliyev appeared at the plenary 
session of this EuroNest Parliamentary Assembly 
and used that forum for one-third of the time to 
criticise Armenia and the Government of 
Armenia on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. It 
was totally outside of the agenda. I mean, we TOWARDS ‘EURONEST 2.0’: WHAT SHOULD THE NEXT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEARN FROM ITS PREDECESSOR? | 5 
 
have to face those realities. [But] it was outside of 
the context.” (Interview A). 
However, unlike the first plenary that failed 
to pass any resolution and despite the 
tensions between Azerbaijani and Armenian 
deputies, the members of the EuroNest PA 
managed to pass five resolutions. Although 
the contents of the resolutions have been 
watered down in order to bring the largest 
possible number of deputies on board, they 
are important as the first substantive result 
that the EuroNest members produced 
together. The resolutions are on the future of 
democracy (EuroNest PA, 2012b); on trade 
agreements between the EU and the Eastern 
European Partners (EuroNest PA, 2012f); on 
energy security and renewables (EuroNest 
PA, 2012c); on strengthening civil society 
(EuroNest PA, 2012d); and on the situation 
of Yulia Tymoshenko (EuroNest PA, 2012e). 
The adoption of resolutions by the EuroNest 
PA indicates some progress in EU-EaP 
parliamentary cooperation. 
The third ordinary session adopted 
resolutions on a number of other policy 
areas: regional security challenges 
(EuroNest PA, 2013d), approximation of 
national legislation in EaP countries with EU 
legislation in the economic field (EuroNest 
PA, 2013a), EU-EaP energy interconnections 
and harmonisation of the energy market 
(EuroNest PA, 2013c), and combating 
poverty and social exclusion in the EaP 
(EuroNest PA, 2013b). 
Although four resolutions were adopted, the 
tense atmosphere and the divisions between 
EaP countries (Armenia and Azerbaijan) 1 
                                                      
1 Armenia and Azerbaijan have been in conflict 
for more than two decades over 
Nagorno-Karabakh. More recently, the Safarov 
case added to the tension between the countries. 
Safarov is an Azeri soldier who killed an 
Armenian colleague by axe during NATO 
training in Budapest. Upon extradition to 
Azerbaijan, he was pardoned by the president 
and lauded as a national hero. 
and between political parties in Ukraine2 
and Georgia3 were also prominent during 
the third plenary in Brussels. The MEP 
Gerben Jan Gebrandy (Democrats 66, the 
Netherlands, a member of ALDE in the EP) 
tweeted: “In bureau of #Euronest 
parliamentary  [sic] assembly. Sensitive 
issues: Nagorno [sic], Tymoshenko, 
Merabishvili, Safarov, Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia” (https://twitter.com/ 
search?q=%23Euronest). 
Concluding remarks 
Since the EuroNest’s has been set up, some 
alignment of the EaP countries’ parliaments 
with the EP’s position can be detected. 
However, it was also clear that the real 
issues of concern for the EaP countries’ 
delegates were related to their national 
and/or party agenda rather than to finding 
common ground with the EP or with each 
other. There are no indications that their 
agreement with the EP position reflects their 
genuine point of view. At best, it is a result 
of the Eastern partners’ engaging in strategic 
calculation when participating in the 
EuroNest PA. They obtain a higher status by 
participating in this multilateral setting and, 
perhaps more importantly, they are 
provided with a forum for expressing their 
positions, which they otherwise would not 
have. In exchange, they endorse resolutions 
that promote values and norms usually held 
by the EP. Since these resolutions do not 
involve strong commitments to 
                                                      
2 The imprisonment of Tymoshenko and other 
former ministers in Ukraine has led to fierce 
disagreements among different political parties 
in Ukraine. 
3   In addition to the already strong tensions 
between the parties of Georgian President 
Saakashvili and of Prime Minister Ivanishvili, the 
arrest of Merabishvili, an ally of Saakashvili and 
former minister and MP, has sparked even more 
criticism. It was viewed by some as a political 
persecution of a representative of the previous 
government. 6 | KOSTANYAN & VANDECASTEELE 
 
implementation, the costs for the EaP 
parliaments of supporting these values are 
rather low. Therefore, we argue that, up 
until now, a genuine dialogue between the 
EP and EaP countries’ parliaments has not 
taken place. 
Recommendations 
1. The EP’s application of inclusion and 
exclusion techniques as leverage on the EaP 
parliaments has been perceived as 
inconsistent and based on double standards. 
An EP official admits that many members of 
the EuroNest PA question the current 
arrangement, suggesting that democracy is 
not the only criterion for allowing/refusing 
delegations: “If Belarus is not in, why is 
Azerbaijan there? Are Azerbaijan’s 
democratic credentials better than [those of] 
Belarus?” (Interview B). The EP therefore 
should aim to establish more concrete and 
transparent conditions under which national 
parliaments can be represented. Otherwise, 
the existing incoherence will continue to 
harm the legitimacy of the process. 
2. The EP should organise larger meetings 
more frequently for the Committees that do 
most of the substantive work. Currently, 
there are only two one-day meetings per 
year. This could be increased to three 
sessions lasting two days, allowing for more 
frequent and sustained contacts, which may 
increase the likelihood of constructive 
dialogue. The EuroNest Bureau, which has a 
central role in finding consensus among the 
members of the Assembly, could also 
increase the number of its meetings from 
two to four. 
3. In order to increase the visibility and 
possible impact on EuroNest, the 
Assembly’s plenary meetings could be 
matched with the planning of the EaP 
summits every other year and to the 
ministerial meetings the following year. In 
the current setup, the resolutions produced 
by the EuroNest PA could be outdated by 
the time of the subsequent summit and/or 
the ministerial meeting. Better planning of 
the meeting dates would allow the EuroNest 
PA to make up-to-date recommendations to 
the high-level intergovernmental bodies of 
the EaP, thus becoming more policy 
relevant. TOWARDS ‘EURONEST 2.0’: WHAT SHOULD THE NEXT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEARN FROM ITS PREDECESSOR? | 7 
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